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~~INTELLIGENCE REPORT~~

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COUNTRY Greece

DATE: 25X1A6a

INFO. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT Effects of Markezinis to Undermine the Sophoulis-Tsaionis Government

DIST. 7 October 1947

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PAGES

SUPPLEMENT

ORIGIN
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1. Spyros Markezinis recently discussed the present situation with a group of Greek Army officers representing one of the various secret officer organizations. He suggested to these officers that, on the occasion of the then forthcoming visit of the King to northern Greece, demonstrations to build up the King's prestige and to impress the foreigners accompanying the King should be organized.
2. Markezinis stated specifically that the officers should turn their energies not so much against General Ventiris as against the present government in order to cause its downfall as speedily as possible. He suggested that certain officers should present themselves to the King and express to him their personal anxiety and that of the armed forces generally over the policies of the present government. The King would then be able to bring these fears to the attention of "the foreigners".
3. Markezinis stated further that he held General Papagos in high esteem. Papagos should be built up in the eyes of both the King and the people in every possible manner.
4. The organization represented by these officers is reliably believed to have turned down the Markezinis proposals. The organization decided that it could not be converted into an instrument for the destruction of the government.
5. Apparently this group of officers consider that Papagos is incapable of carrying out the intrigues which Markezinis has in mind, and that a very likely explanation is that Markezinis is seeking to use Papagos as a front man for his own motives.
6. Markezinis maintained that after a two-month trial of amnesty the government will have lost too much prestige to be able to launch successfully a national alert against the rebels. Therefore this will have to be done by another government, either one under himself or a service government under General Papagos.

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